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How persistent is generalised trust? 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
There are at least two competing views on the foundations of generalised trust: experiential 
and cultural.  The experiential perspective emphasises that trust is fragile and remains open to 
environmental influences throughout life, whilst the cultural perspective asserts that trust is a 
stable trait established early in pre-adult life through intergenerational transmission 
mechanisms. Utilising an innovative methodology applied to a major UK longitudinal survey, 
this article tests these alternative accounts by analysing the persistence of generalised trust 
throughout the life-course. In support of the cultural perspective, trust is found to be a relatively 
stable, persistent human trait. Whilst generalised trust is open to change, these changes are 
however temporary with an overriding tendency for individuals to revert back to their initial, 
long-term level. Greater emphasis should be placed on the establishment of initial, pre-adult 
trust, as changes induced by post-childhood environmental forces are likely to be prone to rapid 
decay. 
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Introduction and Background 
Generalised trust—general beliefs about the extent to which other people can be trusted, is 
essential for cooperative relationships (Ostrom, 2000), thriving democracies (Putnam, 1993; 
Tavits, 2006) and economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997). The propensity to trust predicts 
a range of other social behaviours related to cooperation, such as charity work and volunteering 
activities (Bekkers, 2012; Uslaner, 2002). Individuals with high trust in other people are also 
more likely to live longer, and experience better life satisfaction and physical health (Barefoot 
et al., 1998). Generalised trust—by not being based upon personal knowledge of the trusted—
has also been termed in the literature as ‘thin’ interpersonal trust which differs from ‘thick’ 
interpersonal trust—the trust that people have in their family members, relatives and close 
friends (Dinesen, 2013; Khodyakov, 2007). As Uslaner (2008a) argues, generalised trust by 
being more unconditional in nature, holds greater potential for encouraging cooperation, 
coordination and the other societal factors that make democracy work.     
 
A central debate on the formation of generalised trust has focused on the validity of the 
contrasting cultural and experiential perspectives (Uslaner, 2008b).   The cultural perspective 
asserts that trust is a stable attitude, not shaped by immediate experiences (Uslaner, 2002, 
2008b) and established early in pre-adult life through intergenerational transmission 
mechanisms such as childhood socioeconomic status, parental socialization, imitation, 
inculcation, genetics and even birth weight (Dohmen et al., 2012; Guiso et al., 2006; Petersen 
and Aarøe, 2015; Van Lange, 2015). People’s trust can therefore be traced back to the trust of 
their parents and grandparents (Putnam, 1993; Uslaner, 2008b).  An alternative view is the 
experiential perspective, where trust remains open to environmental influences throughout life. 
In this view, trust may be the result of living in a context of fair and impartial institutions 
(Dinesen, 2013). Individuals may also update their initial beliefs as they observe other people’s 
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trustworthiness, a type of ‘trust responsiveness’ mechanism (Guerra and Zizzo, 2004). On this 
account, trust is fragile, since new and powerful post-childhood experiences, such as burglary 
or unexpected unemployment may change one’s perception of another’s trustworthiness. Prior 
empirical evidence, which primarily focuses on natural experiments in the context of migration 
and ethnic heritage data, suggests that trust exhibits both cultural and experiential foundations. 
Uslaner (2008b) found that people whose grandparents came to the United States from 
countries that have high levels of trust tend to have higher generalised trust. Dinesen (2012) in 
analysing whether first-generation immigrants from low-trust countries of origin are affected 
by migrating to high-trust countries, found that immigrants display higher levels of trust than 
comparable respondents in their country of origin. Resolving these alternate perspectives is 
critical from a public policy perspective. If trust is culturally transmitted then even successful 
government support measures designed to boost current trust are unlikely to be durable and 
therefore effect the long-term aggregate level of generalised trust (Uslaner, 2008b).   
 
In exploring these central issues, this paper—utilising a commonly used measure of generalised 
trust (specifically, “In general, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t 
be too careful these days?”)  drawn from 6 waves of a major UK longitudinal survey—analyses 
the extent to which trust persists throughout the life-course. Persistence is operationally defined 
as the tendency for individuals who have certain levels of trust in one period to hold the same 
outlook in subsequent periods. Conceptually, trust may exhibit this temporal dynamic for two 
distinct reasons. Firstly, trust in previous periods may have a causal effect on current trust. A 
consequence of experiencing a particular level of trust is that preferences or any constraints 
relevant to future trust may be altered. Individuals who have experienced certain levels of trust 
in the past are therefore more likely to experience them again in the future. For instance, trust 
is often used as a way of coping with complexity and to facilitate decision making under 
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uncertainty, especially when risk is hard to calculate (Guseva and Rona-Tas, 2001). High-trust 
in one period may therefore encourage beneficial cooperative interactions or alternatively, ease 
the cognitive load of decision making, enhancing the likelihood of future periods of high-trust. 
This type of temporal persistence is referred to as “true” state dependence. Secondly, in line 
with the cultural perspective on generalised trust, individuals may possess certain 
characteristics which make them more likely to hold certain trust attitudes. Characteristics may 
include socioeconomic factors which are typically observable to the researcher. Alternatively, 
characteristics transmitted from parents to children, through genetics, pre-adult socialization 
experiences and culture may not be readily observable.  To the extent to which these 
unobservable characteristics are persistent over time, they will induce persistence in 
generalised trust. Past trust may therefore appear to have a causal influence on future trust by 
simply picking up the effect of permanent unobserved individual heterogeneity, a mechanism 
commonly referred to as “spurious” state dependence. In estimating these causes of persistence, 
it is possible to analyse the extent to which environmentally triggered changes in an 
individual’s perception of others’ trustworthiness today has lasting effects on future trust. If 
trust is truly state dependent, then successful government support measures will have lasting 
effects as they will permanently alter the individual’s long-term trust state.  However, if trust 
is primarily influenced by permanent characteristics inherited through intergenerational 
transmission mechanisms, trust is unlikely to be durably influenced by public policy or other 
environmental forces. 
 
Overall, this paper finds strong evidence in support of the cultural perspective. Generalised 
trust is found to be a stable, persistent human trait which is characterised by substantial 
“spurious” state dependence. Whilst generalised trust is open to change—lending some support 
for the experiential perspective—“true” state dependence effects are only modest in size, 
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indicating that any changes in generalised trust throughout the life-course will only display 
partial persistence with an overriding tendency for individuals to revert back to their initial, 
long-term level of generalised trust.  
 
 
Data Source and Descriptive Analysis 
The data used for analysis are taken from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) a 
nationally representative survey of more than 5,000 households and containing approximately 
10,000 individuals aged 16 and over. Households are re-interviewed annually, with 18 waves 
of annual data available between 1991 and 2008. The sample used in the subsequent analysis 
is restricted to the original BHPS sample covering Great Britain. The dependent variable in all 
analyses that follow is the standard generalised trust question, which asks respondents, “In 
general, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can‘t be too careful these 
days”. The question was administered in the 1998, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2007 and 2008 waves of 
the BHPS. Respondents selecting the ‘most people can be trusted’ option are coded 1 (High-
Trust), those selecting ‘you can‘t be too careful’ are coded 0 (Low-Trust). Individuals who 
impulsively responded ‘it depends’ (approximately 4% over all waves) were dropped from the 
analysis.i  After limiting the sample to include only those individuals who were observed in all 
of the six waves and who had valid responses to the dependent and independent variables used 
in the subsequent analysis, yields a final balanced panel of 3,700 individuals with 22,200 
individual-year observations. The mean age of the balanced sample is approximately 49 years, 
spanning from 16 to 96. Just over 56% of the sample are female, 14% report holding a 
university degree with 18% reporting leaving compulsory schooling with no formal 
qualifications. Lastly, 64% of the sample are currently in employment. Full summary statistics 
6 
 
for the variables used in the subsequent multivariate analysis are available from Table A1 in 
the online Appendix.ii 
 
 
To illustrate the persistence of trust revealed in the data, I firstly analyse a Markov Chain with 
the two possible states of trust, 𝑆 = {0,1}, where the transition matrix is given by; 𝑃 =
0 1
0 0.8240 0.1760
1 0.2557 0.7443
, 𝑛 = 18,500. Here the rows indicate previous trust while the columns 
indicate current trust. For instance, the entries in the second row represent the probabilities for 
current trust states following a period of high-trust. The probability of high-trust (low-trust) 
conditional on being high-trust (low-trust) in the previous period is 74.4% (82.4%). This is 
illustrative of considerable persistence in trust attitudes, although individuals may experience 
some short-term volatility in trust between the observable periods.  
 
Yet trust is not a once for all phenomenon. Figure 1, presents the distribution of the individual 
variability in trust, by utilizing the sum of the absolute values of movements from one wave to 
the next, ∑ |(𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+1 −
5
𝑖=1 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡)|. Approximately 50% of individuals experienced no 
change in their trust between 1998 and 2008. Of those who experienced at least one change in 
trust, there is a strong tendency for individuals to revert back to their initial trust state. 
Only14.6% of individuals exhibited three or more changes in their level of trust.  
 
[Figure 1] 
 
 
Figure 2 looks at the persistence or conversely, the decay rates of high-trust and low-trust 
conditional on when the individual was first observed in each trust state. For instance there 
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were 1,564 individuals initially observed as high-trust in 1998; 70% (𝑛 = 1092) were still 
observed as high-trust in 2000 and 44% (𝑛 = 688) were continuously observed as high-trust 
throughout the six periods. For the 2,136 individuals initially observed as low-trust in 1998; 
54.5% (𝑛 = 1165) remained as low-trust continuously throughout the remaining periods. It is 
important to note that these are lower bound estimates owing to the fact that an individual’s 
initial trust status may in some cases be the result of a recent change. To put these figures in 
perspective, consider a six period game, where people are assigned trust on sequential 
independent draws from a binomial distribution with constant probabilities across the six 
periods. Assuming that the probability of high-trust is 0.41 (the approximate stationary 
distribution of the Markov Chain and the average probability of high-trust in the pooled data), 
for a sample of 3,700 individuals, I would expect (0.416) × 3700 = 17.6 individuals to report 
high-trust in all six periods. Similarly, I would expect 156 individuals to report low-trust in all 
six periods.  
 
For individuals who were not initially observed as high-trust in 1998, but who experienced a 
change to high-trust later in the panel, the decay rates are substantially stronger. This is 
illustrative of some partial persistence in newly formed trust levels but with a strong tendency 
for individuals to revert back to their initial trust state. For instance, of the individuals who 
were first observed as high-trust in 2003 (𝑛 = 330), only 33% (𝑛 = 108) were observed as 
high-trust in the next period and 12.7% (𝑛 = 42) were observed continuously as high-trust up 
to and including the last year of the panel.  Similar patterns of results reveal themselves for 
low-trust decay rates.  
 
 
[Figure 2] 
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Methodology 
To formally model the persistence of trust I use a dynamic random effects probit model to 
decompose the ‘persistence’ observed in the raw data into that which can be explained by 
unobservable permanent heterogeneity (“spurious” state dependence) and “true” state 
dependence.  The general form of the dynamic model can be written as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛿𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,   (𝑖 = 1, … . , 𝑁;  𝑡 = 2, … . , 𝑇𝑖)  (1) 
 
where 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡
∗  is the individual’s latent probability of trust in each year of the sequence of 𝑇𝑖. 
An individual is observed to be high-trust,  𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡=1, in year 𝑡 when his/her propensity to 
trust exceeds a threshold (zero in this case). 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 is a binary indicator for the individual’s 
trust in the previous period and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of sociodemographic and socioeconomic control 
variables which include; age, gender, log-transformed household income, employment status, 
educational attainment, marital status, housing tenure, ethnicity, the number of dependent 
children in the household, household size and year effects. These control variables were chosen 
as resources, education and age in particular have been shown to be strong correlates of trust 
(Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Uslaner, 2002). The remaining variation in trust is captured by 𝛼𝑖 +
𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,  where 𝛼𝑖 is an unobservable individual-specific attribute or random effect and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the 
idiosyncratic error term which picks up the effect of time-varying unobservable determinants. 
Both are assumed to have a mean of zero and be normally distributed, with the variance of 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 normalised to one, and the variance of 𝛼𝑖 estimated by the model. Two issues arise from 
this standard random effects model. Firstly, it assumes that 𝛼𝑖 and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 are uncorrelated with 
each other. Secondly, because a dynamic model is estimated an ‘initial conditions’ problem 
arises if  𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖1 is correlated with 𝛼𝑖, which induces a correlation between 𝜀𝑖𝑡 and 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡−1, 
leading to bias in the parameter estimates. To deal with the initial conditions problem in 
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estimating dynamic models and to allow αi to be correlated with the regressors, I follow the 
respective approaches laid out by Wooldridge (2005) and Mundlak (1978). Specifically, I 
specify a model that assumes αi  is both correlated with the regressors and the initial 
endowment of trust. This approach is implemented by parameterizing the individual effect as:  
 
𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾
′?̅?𝑖 + 𝜑𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖1 + 𝑢𝑖 (2) 
 
where ?̅?𝑖 is the individual time means of all the time-varying control variables, 𝑢𝑖 is the 
individual effect which is assumed to be distributed 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) and 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖1 is the individual’s 
initial trust state. Substituting equation (2) into (1) gives us our full model as shown in equation 
(3). The parameter 𝛿  measures “true” state dependence and therefore the extent to which past 
trust is passed on to both contemporary and future trust. At the two extreme cases, an 
exogenously determined change in prior trust (shock) will either be permanently passed on to 
future trust or alternatively, shocks will fully dissipate and the individual will revert 
immediately back to his or her base-line trust state. The estimate of 𝜑 is also relevant as it 
provides information about the correlation between the individual effect and the individual’s 
initial trust level. 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛿𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾
′?̅?𝑖 + 𝜑𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖1 +  𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , (𝑖 = 1, … . , 𝑁;  𝑡 = 2, … . , 𝑇𝑖)  (3) 
 
Empirical Results  
Table 1 reports the results from the dynamic model presented in equation (3). Marginal effects 
are reported, where characteristics are held constant and the random effect is set to zero. The 
marginal effects on the time-varying control variables can be interpreted as measures of short-
term transitory effects and are equivalent to estimates from a fixed-effect estimator (Mundlak, 
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1978). The mean measures of the time-varying control variables can be interpreted as long-
term or permanent effects. For brevity I only report the results for the variables of interest. Full 
results are available from Table A2 in the online Appendix. 
 
Firstly, as the random effects probit restricts 𝜀𝑖𝑡 to be 𝑁(0,1), the total error variance is given 
by 𝜎𝑢
2 + 1. The importance of unobserved permanent heterogeneity in understanding the 
overall error variance is given by 𝑟ℎ𝑜 = 𝜎𝑢
2/(𝜎𝑢
2 + 1), which is the intra-class correlation of 
trust attitudes across periods of observation. When 𝑟ℎ𝑜 is high, unobserved permanent 
heterogeneity (“spurious” state dependence) is important and individuals can be said to 
experience high persistence in trust attitudes. When 𝑟ℎ𝑜 is low then individuals experience 
relatively high random fluctuations and therefore low persistence in trust. From Table 1, 
unobserved permanent individual heterogeneity is an important influence for trust persistence 
in the dynamic model, explaining 53.6% of the overall error variance.  
 
Secondly, net of the observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity, a past trust shock has 
a genuine behavioural effect, in the sense that an observational equivalent individual who did 
not experience the shock would behave differently in the future than an individual who did. 
Specifically the “true” state dependence estimate shows a statistically significant positive 
association between past and contemporary trust. The marginal effect, where characteristics 
are held constant and the random effect is set to zero, suggests that someone with high-trust in 
𝑡 − 1 has a probability of contemporary high-trust approximately 10.8 percentage points higher 
than someone with low-trust in 𝑡 − 1. Comparing the “true” state dependence estimate to the 
raw aggregate probabilities contained in the Markov Chain, approximately 20% of the 
observable persistence can be attributed to “true” state dependence. The reverse scenario is also 
true, in that, prior low-trust has a causal effect on the likelihood of contemporary low-trust of 
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the same magnitude. This may reflect a vicious cycle in which low-trust in one period may 
promote cheating or diminish cooperative or interpersonal interactions, enhancing the 
likelihood of low-trust in future periods (Neville, 2012). These estimates, whilst positive and 
statistically significant, are substantially different from the extreme case where shocks to past 
trust alter the individual’s base-line level of trust indefinitely. In fact, the estimates are closer 
to the other extreme, where shocks fully dissipate and the individual reverts immediately back 
to his or her base-line level of trust. To echo this point, the individual’s initial trust status is 
also positive and highly statistically significant representing a strong correlation between an 
individual’s initial trust state and the unobserved permanent heterogeneity. Moreover, initial 
period trust is more strongly correlated with current trust than previous trust, indicative of some 
short-term mobility in trust around an underlying base-line level.iii 
 
[Table 1] 
 
 
A final important finding is that both the time-averaged household income variable and the 
time-averaged university degree variable in the dynamic model, representing relatively fixed 
underlying socioeconomic differences between individuals, are positive and statistically 
significant. Additionally, transitory current household income and educational attainment are 
not statistically significant. This highlights the importance of permanent socioeconomic factors 
in the formation of generalised trust, as well as the absence of time-varying environmental 
influences.    
 
Concluding Remarks  
Despite the burgeoning literature on the contrasting cultural and experiential perspectives of 
generalised trust, the persistence of trust throughout an individual’s life-course has remained 
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an untested area of research. Using an innovative methodology I find that trust, whilst not a 
fixed human trait, does display high levels of temporal persistence—the tendency for 
individuals who have certain levels of trust in one period to hold the same outlook in subsequent 
periods. Firstly, this paper provides support for the cultural perspective, in that, permanent 
observable and unobservable characteristics explain a substantial proportion of this persistence. 
Whilst evidence is provided that generalised trust is open to fluctuations, trust is found to 
exhibit only moderate “true” state dependence, indicating that any changes in generalised trust 
throughout the life-course will only display partial persistence, with an overriding tendency for 
individuals to revert back to their initial, long-term level. This in itself has important 
implications for a central question in social capital research, namely whether attributes such as 
trust can be durably influenced by public policy (Putnam, 1993; Uslaner, 2002). If our 
underlying propensity to trust is not based upon our immediate experiences but upon strong 
cultural roots, then it is difficult to see how public policy can durably influence trust, unless 
these policies target the deeper values societies hold. For instance, promoting equality through 
the redistribution of resources is within the capacity of governments (Uslaner, 2002).   
 
Acknowledgements: The author would like to thank Paul Baker, David de Meza, Phil 
Tomlinson and Joanna Syrda for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
i Generalised trust is sometimes asked on an 11-point scale. However, responses on this 
broader scale tend to be clustered around the middle, which makes it difficult to distinguish 
between different types of trust (Uslaner, 2008b). 
ii Sample attrition rates in the BHPS are generally low and certainly comparable to those 
achieved in other similar household panels. In common with nearly all previously published 
research using this data source, attrition is assumed to be a random event. 
iii Estimation using a larger unbalanced sample gave qualitatively and quantitatively similar 
results. Results were also similar when the estimation strategy was conducted on sub-samples 
based upon gender, age, household income and education. 
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Figure 1: Frequency distribution of the observed variability in trust (absolute value of 
movements) 
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Figure 2: Persistence and decay rates for high-trust and low-trust  
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Table 1: Correlates of Trust - Dynamic Correlated Random Effects Probit 
 
Variables Marginal Effects Robust Standard Errors 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 0.108** 0.015 
Age 0.011 0.028 
Female -0.014 0.018 
Log household income 0.008 -0.008 
Educational attainment (reference: no 
qualifications) 
 
 
University degree 0.125 0.106 
Vocational college qualification -0.012 0.081 
A-Level -0.008 0.093 
O-Level/GCSE’s 0.006 0.088 
Other qualifications 0.044 0.124 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡1 0.600** 0.018 
Mean - Age -0.006 0.028 
Mean - Log household income 0.096** 0.020 
Mean - University degree 0.249* 0.113 
Mean - Vocational college qualification 0.147 0.086 
Mean - A-Level 0.182 0.101 
Mean - O-Level/GCSE’s 0.125 0.094 
Mean - Other qualifications 0.028 0.130 
𝑟ℎ𝑜 = 𝜎𝑢
2/(𝜎𝑢
2 + 1) 0.536** 0.016 
Log Likelihood -8157.93  
Observations 18,500  
Number of Individuals 3,700  
Notes: Main entries are unstandardized marginal effects. Robust standard errors are adjusted 
for intra-individual correlation.  The model also includes employment status, marital status, 
housing tenure, ethnicity, the number of dependent children in the household, household size 
and year effects as additional control variables. The model also includes the time means of all 
the time-varying control variables. Asterisks indicate significant coefficients (∗ 𝑝 < 0.05, ∗∗
𝑝 < 0.01).  
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Online Appendix 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variable   
Trust 0.413  
Control Variables   
Female 0.562  
Age 49.127 15.906 
White  0.977  
Married 0.751  
Widowed 0.141  
Single, never married 0.108  
Divorced/separated 0.082  
Own house outright 0.317  
Own house with mortgage 0.492  
Rents house, private sector 0.060  
Rents house, social sector 0.131  
University degree 0.141  
Vocational college qualification 0.326  
A-Level 0.096  
O-Level/GCSE’s 0.165  
Other qualifications 0.084  
No qualifications 0.188  
Number of dependent children in the 
household 0.564 0.945 
Household size 2.769 1.279 
Log household income 7.693 0.925 
Self-employed 0.074  
Employee 0.565  
Unemployed 0.017  
Economically inactive 0.344  
Observations 22,000  
Number of Individuals 3,700  
 
  
19 
 
Table A2: Correlates of Trust - Dynamic Correlated Random Effects Probit 
 
Variables Marginal Effects Robust Standard Errors 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 0.108** 0.015 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡1 0.600** 0.018 
Female -0.014 0.018 
Age 0.011 0.028 
White  0.146* 0.059 
Marital status (reference: single, never 
married) 
  
Married 0.016 0.037 
Widowed -0.052 0.066 
Divorced/separated 0.023 0.063 
Housing tenure (reference: social 
sector renter) 
  
Own house outright 0.084 0.050 
Own house with mortgage 0.086 0.047 
Rents house, private sector 0.025 0.050 
Educational attainment (reference: no 
qualifications) 
  
University degree 0.125 0.106 
Vocational college qualification -0.012 0.081 
A-Level -0.008 0.093 
O-Level/GCSE’s 0.006 0.088 
Other qualifications 0.044 0.124 
Number of dependent children in the 
household 
0.027 0.014 
Household size -0.014 0.011 
Log household income 0.008 0.008 
Employment status (reference: 
employee) 
  
Self-employed 0.049 0.034 
Unemployed -0.014 0.054 
Economically inactive -0.028 0.024 
Mean - Age -0.006 0.028 
Mean - Married -0.007 0.052 
Mean - Widowed 0.066 0.084 
Mean - Divorced/separated -0.017 0.080 
Mean - Own house outright -0.017 0.059 
Mean - Own house with mortgage 0.024 0.058 
Mean - Rents house, private sector 0.124 0.074 
Mean - University degree 0.249* 0.113 
Mean - Vocational college qualification 0.147 0.086 
Mean - A-Level 0.182 0.101 
Mean  - O-Level/GCSE’s 0.125 0.094 
Mean - Other qualification  0.028 0.130 
Mean - Number of dependent children in 
the household 
0.013 0.023 
Mean - Household size -0.036* 0.018 
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Mean - Log household income 0.096** 0.020 
Mean - Self-employed -0.023 0.052 
Mean - Unemployed -0.238 0.141 
Mean - Economically inactive -0.031 0.039 
𝑟ℎ𝑜 = 𝜎𝑢
2/(𝜎𝑢
2 + 1) 0.536** 0.016 
Log Likelihood -8157.93  
Observations 18,500  
Number of Individuals 3,700  
Notes: Main entries are unstandardized marginal effects. Robust standard errors are adjusted 
for intra-individual correlation.  The model also includes year effects as additional control 
variables. Asterisks indicate significant coefficients  (∗ 𝑝 < 0.05, ∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.01).  
 
 
